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Offer-Price Discount of Bank Seasoned Equity Offers: Do Voluntary 
and  Involuntary Offers Convey Different Information? 
 




Seasoned equity offers made by undercapitalized banks (labeled involuntary offers) could 
be different from other seasoned equity offers because the issuer is presumably under 
regulatory duress to make up the shortfall in required capital. For this reason, involuntary 
offers may exhibit limited managerial opportunism. When a firm issues seasoned equity, 
investment bankers gather information about the issuer in the period between the 
registration of the offer and its issue date. The information gathered during the book-
building process gets reflected in the offer price discount on the issue date. We find that 
the offer price discount appears to convey more information to investors on the issue date 
for the voluntary issuers. However, we find that both types of issues show signs of 
market timing, and that investors react negatively to both types of issuance 
announcements. Our results are robust to several checks. 
 
 
Keywords: Bank seasoned equity offers; offer price discount; managerial opportunism. 





1. Introduction  
In the months leading to a Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO), as part of its due diligence 
the lead investment banker collects information about the issuer and determines a 
preliminary range for the offer price of the stock.1 Following the registration of the offer with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the lead underwriter gathers new 
information about the issuer during the book-building process. The discount at which the 
seasoned equity is offered relative to the stock price just preceding the issue date is called the 
“Offer Price Discount” (OPD).2  Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) make the case that for 
industrial SEOs, the investment bankers convey this updated information to their buy-side 
investors via the offer price discount.  Issue day price reaction is more negative the larger the 
offer price discount.3 
Prior academic research has excluded bank SEOs while analyzing the stock price impact 
of the offer price discount.  However, bank SEOs provide an interesting laboratory setting for 
examining the information gathering process and the price discount-effect because Cornett 
and Tehranian (1994) document that all bank seasoned equity issues are not created equal.  
Cornett and Tehranian segregate SEOs made by banks that are already adequately 
capitalized from offers where the issuing institution has fallen below the capital adequacy 
standard.  They label the former “Voluntary” and the latter as “Involuntary” SEOs because 
the issuer is presumably under regulatory duress to make up the shortfall in required capital.  
Cornett and Tehranian present evidence which suggests that Voluntary offers are possibly 
made by opportunistic managers, issuing overvalued stock.  On the other hand, they argue 
that the discretion to optimally time Involuntary offers may be relatively limited because of 
the pressure from bank regulators to raise equity capital.  
If investment bankers gather evidence of managerial opportunism in the interim period 
between the announcement date and the issue date for Voluntary issuers, they may signal 
this information to their buy-side clients by setting deeper discounts for such offers. On the 
other hand, the discount on the Involuntary issues may simply represent the investment 
                                                 
1 Lowry and Schwert (2004) document that even public information is not fully incorporated into the initial price 
range. 
2  Benveniste and Spindt (1986) argue that price discount is the means by which the investment banker 
compensates institutional investors for investigating the equity value of the firm and providing information about 
the demand for the offer. Parsons and Raviv (1985) argue that for issuers about whom investors have more 
heterogeneous beliefs (and hence, valuations), the price discount will be higher. Loderer, Sheehan, and Kadlec 
(1991) and Gerard and Nanda (1993) advance the idea that the offer price discounts can be inflated through 
manipulative trading between the announcement date and the offer date. 
3 Singh (1997) examines utilities, and Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine a combination of industrials and 




banker’s desire to make the equity of a troubled bank attractive to investors.  If that is the 
case, the market may react more negatively to the discount on voluntary issues than on 
involuntary issues.  So, the first question we address in our paper is the following. Does the 
market interpret the offer price discount differently for Voluntary and Involuntary issuers? 
We find that there is indeed a difference in the market reaction to the offer price discount 
between the two types of offers.  Although the average magnitude of the discount is similar 
for both types of issues, the market’s response to the discount is not.  The discount results in 
a significantly larger negative marginal price impact for Voluntary issues relative to 
Involuntary issues. Thus, there appears to be new negative information in the offer price 
discount only for the Voluntary issues.   
Even though this result seems to confirm that the investment banker signals the 
opportunistic behavior of the Voluntary issuers through the discount on the issue date, we 
cannot yet completely rule out opportunistic behavior by the Involuntary issuers.  The market 
may have already reacted to the opportunistic behavior of the involuntary issuers on the 
announcement date.  But what would generate this asymmetry in event windows?  Put 
differently, when would one expect to see the market reaction to anticipated opportunism if 
the issuer is a well-capitalized bank vs. an undercapitalized bank? 
If the issuer is under-capitalized, the market will realize upon announcement that the 
issuer has chosen an expensive form of raising capital by tapping outside equity.   
Undercapitalized banks often use alternative methods to fix their capital adequacy problems, 
such as restricting asset growth or retaining a larger fraction of their earnings.4  O u r  
discussions with regulators confirmed that undercapitalized banks do get sufficient time to 
become adequately capitalized through a variety of ways.  Thus, resorting to an SEO to raise 
additional equity to meet capital adequacy requirements may strike investors in much the 
same way as they regard SEOs by well-capitalized banks.  As a matter of fact, we find that 
the announcements of both types of offers are timed after a significant stock price run-up.5  If 
the pre-event run-up is evidence of managerial opportunism and ability to time the SEO, 
then the fact that it does not differ across the two types of bank SEOs is evidence that 
managers are able to time the Involuntary offers as well. 
                                                 
4 These alternative methods also include shrinking in size, and adjusting the balance sheet towards assets with 
lower capital charge.  For example, a bank can sell its mortgage portfolio and replace it with mortgage-backed 
securities.  This arrangement reduces a bank’s credit risk exposure and cuts its capital charge by more than half (4 
cents for every dollar in mortgages versus 1.6 cents for every dollar in Government Sponsored Enterprise backed 
Mortgage Backed Securities). 
5 Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1998) observe a significant stock price run-up for both types of issues, which 




However, the key difference between a voluntary and an involuntary issuer is that there 
is still some uncertainty on the announcement date about the true intention of the voluntary 
issuer.  Well-capitalized issuers may have valuable investment opportunities and room to 
grow, while the growth of undercapitalized banks is severely restricted.  In that case, the 
market may conclude on the announcement date that the involuntary (undercapitalized) 
issuer is most likely acting opportunistically.  However, the market may wait for the 
investment bank’s discount signal before passing a final judgment on the managerial 
opportunism of the voluntary (well-capitalized) issuer.  In other words, the market reaction 
to voluntary issuers on the announcement date is only partial with the remainder occurring 
on the issue date as a function of the discount. 
To test our hypothesis that the reaction to the opportunism of involuntary issuers occurs 
on the announcement date, we go back in time and ask the following question: does the 
market react negatively to the announcement of involuntary issues? 
We find that the announcement period market reaction is significantly negative for both 
Involuntary and Voluntary SEOs.  Because this finding is not consistent with Cornett and 
Tehranian’s result that the reaction to involuntary issue announcement is zero, we perform a 
battery of robustness checks of our announcement period results. First, we re-classify all 
SEOs into Voluntary and Involuntary issues in terms of a distance to failure measure, rather 
than by the regulatory capitalization norms. Second, we allow for a cushion around the 
regulatory capital adequacy norm cutoffs, because banks that are just barely overcapitalized 
by the strict norms may still feel pressure from the regulators and the market to shore up 
their equity capital. Third, we consider the possibility that the degree of market pressure to 
raise external capital may be an important issue that dominates regulatory norms. Banks that 
are adequately capitalized from a regulatory perspective may be undercapitalized relative to 
their peers. Accordingly we construct two market-based capital-adequacy norms. Each time 
we find that the market reacts significantly negatively to both types of issues. 
Moreover, a fresh influx of equity capital into distressed banks implies a wealth transfer 
from the shareholders to the debt-holders or to the insurers of bank debt (the Merton model, 
1974).  This implies a negative market reaction to the announcement of an SEO by the most 
distressed banks. We find support for both the “market timing” and the “Merton model” 
explanations in the negative stock reaction to Involuntary issue announcements. 
  If indeed Voluntary and Involuntary issuers both engage in market-timing, as our 
findings at announcement or at their issue dates suggest, their long-run performance should 
be similar as well. However, Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1998) document significant 




average return on assets, the average net-charge-off levels, and the risk-adjusted abnormal 
return in the 3-year post-issue period seem to be worse for the Voluntary issues than for the 
Involuntary issues, but not significantly so. Although the majority of our results are not 
supportive of the findings in Cornett and Tehranian, we do find that Voluntary issuers are 
significantly more likely to be delisted following a decline in stock price within five years 
after the issue. Thus we do offer marginal support for the findings in Cornett, Mehran and 
Tehranian. 
Our paper’s contributions are three-fold.  First, we reject the Cornett and Tehranian 
hypothesis that the market-timing of Involuntary offers may be relatively limited because 
they are forced to raise equity capital under duress from bank regulators.  Both types of 
issuers act opportunistically.  Second, the negative reaction to involuntary SEO 
announcements is more than a simple reaction to anticipated opportunism.  The reaction 
may also partly reflect the negative impact of the issue on the option value of the equity.  
Third, we show that there is an asymmetry in the reaction to the offer price discount between 
Voluntary and Involuntary offers.  From this finding we infer that the reaction to 
opportunism occurs on the announcement date for involuntary issuers and it is split between 
the announcement and issue dates for voluntary issuers. For the Voluntary offers, the 
determining factor for the issue date reaction is the investment banker’s signal through the 
offer price discount.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes our data 
of bank SEOs segregated into Voluntary and Involuntary issues.  Section 3 analyzes the issue 
date discount and the returns around issue date. Section 4 analyzes the announcement 
period returns.  Section 5 examines the post-issue long-run performance.  Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Voluntary and Involuntary SEOs 
Our data comprises public issues of seasoned equity made by commercial banks and 
Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in the United States for the period 1983 through 1999. The 
sample starts in 1983 because the 17 largest banks were first required to comply with new 
capital standards in June of that year.6 We end our sample in 1999 in order to track delistings 
in the following 5-year period. 
The seasoned common stock offering data are taken from the data files of Thomson 
Financial’s SDC Platinum database. The SDC Platinum database provides data on issues, 
                                                 




including data on issue type, lead bank identity, announcement date, issue date, gross 
proceeds excluding the overallotment option, offer price, and shares issued. For each issue, 
we search the Lexis-Nexis newswires and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Publications 
Library (DJNR) for articles reporting the announcement of the offer, to confirm SDC’s 
announcement date. If the announcement date from our Lexis-Nexis and DJNR search differs 
from that reported in SDC, we use the newswire/DJNR date. We also cross check the 
issuance dates with the Investment Dealer’s Digest (IDD) for issues made until 1996. For 
issues made from 1996 onwards, we check the issue date from the EDGAR database of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). If the issue date found from IDD or EDGAR 
differs from that reported by SDC, we use the IDD/EDGAR date.  
A bank’s capital adequacy is determined by its total capital ratio. Financial statement 
information needed to calculate the total capital ratios and other balance sheet and income 
statement data are obtained from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s 
Reports and Income and Condition (call reports) for commercial banks and Y-9 statements 
for BHCs. To calculate the total capital ratios, we use the formulas published by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the Federal Register on January 1st of each year 
(Title 12 Part 225 Appendix A for BHCs and Part 208 Appendix A for commercial banks). 
After 1989, we use capital adequacy formulas that reflect the risk-based capital guidelines. 
Thus, the calculation of the total capital ratio varies from period to period, and is different for 
commercial banks and BHCs. The details on how the total capital ratios are calculated, 
period-by-period, for both commercial banks and BHCs (together called “banks”), are shown 
in the Appendix. 
We exclude all ADRs, secondary offers, and SEOs that have warrants or are part of a unit 
offer.  Small offers are also deleted from the sample (those under $5 million). Next, we 
carefully went through the newswires and DJNR to determine whether an issue is made 
pursuant to a previous shelf registration. We also received from Disclosure the scanned 
cover pages of the prospectuses for several issues for which the issue date is relatively close 
to the announcement date, to determine shelf registrations. We then removed all issues that 
were made as part of a previous shelf registration. After these screens, we end up with a 
sample of 227 SEOs.  
A large number of bank SEOs in 1985-86 resulted from new minimum total capital ratio 
requirements of 5.5% imposed in 1985 and 6% imposed in 1986. The reduction in the number 
of issues in the period 1988–90 was due to poor market conditions for new bank issues, 
possibly a consequence of a number of bank failures during this period. Bank SEOs again 




by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). The 
number of issues drops off subsequently because most banking firms appear to have raised 
the capital required to meet the new capital adequacy requirement. 
We look at the minimum total capital ratio a bank must attain to be considered “well-
capitalized” according to the Federal Reserve guidelines (or “Zone 1” before the “well-
capitalized” zone was established by FDICIA).  Between 1983 and 1989, this regulatory 
requirement in terms of total capital ratio was 7 percent (also see Cornett and Tehranian, 
1994). In 1990 and 1991, it was 8 percent.  After 1991, it has been set at 10 percent. Banks that 
are below these limits at the end of the quarter preceding the SEO announcement are 
classified as Involuntary (IVL) issuers, and those above as Voluntary (VL) issuers. Table 1 
shows the distribution of VL and IVL issues on a year-by-year basis.  The bulk of the IVL 
issues occur in the early 1980’s at the introduction of the capital requirements.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
The average bank size in our final sample is around $14 billion in total assets, and the 
average SEO size is 1.66 percent of total assets.  The average Carter-Manaster Reputation 
(CMR) score of the lead underwriters is around 8, indicating that the bank SEOs are brought 
to the market by high quality investment banks on average.  Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics for our sample segregated into VL and IVL issues. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
As one would expect, by definition, the total capital ratio is significantly lower for IVL 
issuers, compared to the VL issuers.  The average extent of overcapitalization for the VL 
issuers is 3.54 percent, while the average extent of undercapitalization for IVL issuers is 0.91 
percent of issuer’s total assets immediately before issue announcement.  The IVL issuers are 
also smaller.  A higher proportion of all IVL issues, as compared to the VL issues, are located 
in the Pre-Basel era (1983 - 1987). 
 
3. Discount and Returns around Issue Date 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) and Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine the discount of 
seasoned equity offer price relative to the stock price just preceding the issue date for utilities 










, where P-1 is closing price on the day before the issue day, and OP is the offer 
price. All stock price and returns data are taken from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the mean Discount is 1.52% for IVL issues and 1.90% for 
the VL issues, both of which are significant.  Their difference, however, is statistically 
insignificant.  Thus, investment banks seem to offer equity of both the VL and the IVL issuers 
at relatively the same (significant) discount to the last closing price. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
However, as Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) argue, part of the Discount calculated above 
may have been expected by investors.  Discount may be expected to increase with the 
relative amount of the offer (issue size relative to the issuer’s market value of equity (MVE) a 
week before the issue) because of adverse selection and placement pressure.  Discount may 
also be higher when the stock price is low because marketing of a low-priced stock may be 
more difficult, or when stock return volatility is high to compensate investors for the risk. 
Noting that issue date discount can be a function of the lead underwriter pedigree, the 
exchange in which the issue is listed, and the issue type (VL or IVL), we calculate discount 
surprise as the residual, εD, of the following regression:  
 
Discount = β1IVL + β2VL + β3 lnIssue x IVL+ β4 lnIssue x VL + β5 lnMVE x IVL+ β6 lnMVE x VL  









 x VL + β13 Stdev x IVL + β14 Stdev x VL + εD, 
 
where, following Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), P-5 is the closing price 5 days before the Issue 
date, and Stdev is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted return in the 100 day period 
from 121 days before the issue date through 22 days before the issue date.  We compute the 
market-adjusted return on the issue date, MARISS, as the difference between the stock return 
on the issue date and the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted 
market returns.  The relative size of the offer is captured by the two variables: lnIssue, the 
natural log of the gross issue proceeds from the offering exclusive of overallotment options, 




date (again following Altinkilic and Hansen (2003)).  The lead underwriter reputation is 
measured by CMR, the Carter-Manaster score, as modified by Ritter and made available on 
his web site: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.xls.  We have three dummy variables in the 
regression equation: Nasdaq is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the stock trades 
on Nasdaq, and 0 otherwise, VL and IVL take the value of 1 if the issue is Voluntary and 
Involuntary, respectively.  Panel B of Table 3 shows that the only significant determinants of 
Discount are the intercept terms (VL and IVL), which are statistically indistinguishable; none 
of the above-mentioned observable variables are significant.  
Next, we examine the issue day returns.  The issue date return, MARISS, is insignificantly 
different from zero for both VL and IVL issues.  We also examine separately banks that have 
greater than $1 billion in total assets at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement 
(“big” issuers) and issue sizes that are greater than 1% of the total assets of a bank (“big” 
issues).  The results are similar (Table 4, Panel A). Figure 1 shows that there are no return 
outliers in both the VL and IVL sample. 
To examine the link between issue-date returns and issue-date discount, we regress 
MARISS on the discount surprise.  Other factors like the extent of undercapitalization or 
overcapitalization of a bank immediately prior to the issue announcement, or the pedigree of 
the investment bank bringing the issue to the market could influence market reaction to issue 
announcements.  Therefore, we control for other possible factors that may influence issue 
date returns using the following regression specification: 
 
MARISS =  β1 IVL +β2 VL +β3 UnderCap +β4 OverCap +β5 εD x IVL +β6 εD x VL+β ’IVL X x IVL 
+β ’VL X x VL + εISS,                     (2) 
 
where εD is the discount surprise. The degree of undercapitalization, UnderCap, is the dollar 
amount of equity capital needed, as a fraction of total assets, to meet the capital requirements 
as of the end of the quarter before the issue announcement.  UnderCap is zero for well-
capitalized banks.  The degree of overcapitalization, OverCap, is the dollar amount by which 
the equity capital exceeds the capital requirements as a fraction of total assets, at the end of 
the quarter before the issue announcement.  OverCap is zero for undercapitalized banks.  X is 
a vector of control variables that comprises lnAsset, lnIssue, CMR, Nasdaq, AssetGr-1, PreBasel, 
and FDICIA.  The variables, Nasdaq, lnIssue and CMR  have already been defined before, 
lnAsset is the natural log of the total assets of the issuing bank at the end of the quarter 
immediately preceding issue announcement, AssetGr-1 is the growth in total assets in the year 
preceding the issue announcement, PreBasel is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the issue 




FDICIA is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the issue occurred after Basel I went into 
effect but before FDICIA was enacted in 1991. 
 
Figure 1 and Table 4 here 
 
Table 4 shows that, in line with the results found by others for industrials and utilities, 
the market reacts negatively to the news of discount on issue date.  However, the price 
reaction is significantly negative to the discount surprise only for VL issues.  In other words, 
although both types of issues feature discounts of similar magnitude, the information 
content of the discount is significantly more for Voluntary issues.7  The investors appear to 
learn more about the opportunism and market-timing of the Voluntary issuers from the 
information conveyed by the investment bankers through the offer price discount on issue 
date. 
The fact that the discount surprise does not have any significant information content for 
involuntary issues is not enough to exonerate involuntary issuers from allegations of 
opportunistic behavior.  The market may have already reacted to the opportunistic behavior 
of the involuntary issuers on the announcement date.  The reason opportunism may already 
be fully priced in on the announcement date for involuntary issuers is that while there is still 
some uncertainty about the true intent of voluntary issuers (i.e., opportunism vs. funding 
future growth), it is common knowledge that a capital-constrained bank’s investment 
opportunities are restricted by regulators.  The market may, therefore, conclude on the 
announcement date that the involuntary issuer is most likely acting opportunistically. 
To test our hypothesis that the reaction to the opportunism of involuntary issuers occurs 
on the announcement date, we ask the following two questions.  Does the market react 
negatively to the announcement of involuntary issues?  Do involuntary issuers show signs of 
market-timing? 
  
4. Announcement Date Returns  
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where r(t) is the stock return and ν(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
value-weighted market returns.  Following this standard event study methodology, we 
compute the announcement period abnormal returns over several windows to allow for the 
                                                 
7 We also formally test the null H0: εD x IVL versus εD x VL, and find that the regression coefficients are different 
at the 10% significance level. The price effect of discount surprise is significantly more negative for VL issues as 




possibilities that investors might receive information at different points around the 
announcement date.  We examine the announcement period abnormal returns for both our 
full sample period, 1983-1999, and for the sample period of Cornett and Tehranian (1994), 
1983-1989, which we term the CT sample period.  We have roughly the same number of VL 
and IVL issues that Cornett and Tehranian had: we have 1 less IVL issue, and 2 more VL 
issues. In contrast to Cornett and Tehranian, we find that the market reacts significantly 
negatively to both the Voluntary issues and the Involuntary issues in both our full sample 
period and in the CT period (Table 5).  The announcement period market reaction is not 
significantly different between the Voluntary issues and Involuntary issues. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
In other words, we find that SEO announcements, whether Voluntary or Involuntary, 
convey bad news to current shareholders.  This finding is robust to the announcement period 
window and to the sample period.  Thus, our finding is that the market does not seem to 
distinguish between VL and IVL issuers, despite the possibility as suggested by Cornett and 
Tehranian (1994), that IVL issuers may have had limited discretion to time their issues 
because of regulatory pressure.  In fact, the IVL issuers may be deliberately choosing to issue 
overpriced stock rather than use other options---as discussed earlier.  We search for an 
indication of such opportunistic behavior by examining the pre-announcement run-up for 
both VL and IVL issuers.  The pre-announcement abnormal return run-up, MARAD(-60,-4), 
is significantly positive for each and statistically indistinguishable.8  Our results suggest that 
both the VL and IVL issuers time their SEOs after a stock price run-up.  
 
4.1 Robustness checks of the Announcement period results 
Our finding does not support the well-known Cornett and Tehranian (1994) result that 
IVL issues are perceived to be different (upon their announcement) by the market from the 
VL issues because IVL issuers have limited discretion to time their issues because of 
regulatory pressure.  This Cornett and Tehranian result on bank Voluntary and Involuntary 
seasoned equity offers is part of established literature in corporate finance. Unfortunately, 
the Cornett and Tehranian database is no longer accessible.  It is therefore incumbent upon 
us to check that our result is robust. We do this in the following two ways. 
                                                 
8 This result is consistent with Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1998), who document statistically 
indistinguishable pre-issue 1-year abnormal stock returns between VL and IVL issues. 
 





4.1.1 Checking for outliers 
We have just 1 more SEO in our sample during the Cornett and Tehranian period as 
compared to their sample.  However, we cannot identify which of our sample observations 
represent 1 extra SEO.  Hence, we need to check for announcement period return outliers for 
our sample of VL and IVL issues made in the CT period: 1983-1989. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
As Figure 2 shows, there are no return outliers in the IVL sample.  One could argue that 
there may be a couple of return outliers in the VL sample, but they are negative return 
outliers.  If we drop them, the average announcement period market reaction for the VL sub-
sample becomes more positive, which will make our results even more different from that of 
Cornett and Tehranian.  Therefore, return outliers are neither the cause of our result nor the 
cause of the difference between our and Cornett and Tehranian’s result. 
 
4.1.2 Allowing for a cushion in regulatory norms in segregating VL and IVL issuers 
  A bank that is barely overcapitalized may feel uncomfortably close to the danger zone 
and may chose to issue equity to build a defensive cushion.  One could classify those issuers 
among the involuntary ones.  So, we allow for a 1 percent cushion over and above the 
regulatory capital adequacy norm in determining an issue to be an Involuntary one.  This 
significantly increases the number of Involuntary issues in our full sample from 63 to 104 
(from 58 to 90 in the CT period).  Panel A of Table 6 shows that the mean announcement 
period abnormal returns are significantly negative for both the Voluntary and Involuntary 
issues. However in the CT period (1983-1989), which is also the pre-Basel I period, we do 
find that VL issuers experience a significantly more negative price reaction upon 
announcement.  However, the significance disappears as we move the event window from 
(-1, 0) to (-1,+1) or (-3, +3). 
 
Table 6 here 
 
4.1.3 Using the Distance to failure measure to segregate VL and IVL issuers 
It may be possible that bank regulators consider a “distance to failure” measure, in the 
vein of the credit rating agencies.  We use Market Value of Equity divided by its standard 
deviation, calculated over the (-300,-5) window before the issue date, MVE/std(MVE), as our 




can compute the distance to failure based on the above methodology. We then cut this 
sample at the median into VL and IVL issuers. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the 
announcement period abnormal market return continues to be significantly negative for both 
the VL and IVL issuers, and the difference is insignificant.  
 
4.1.4 Using Market-determined Capital norms 
A banker’s discretion to time seasoned equity issues may also be influenced by the 
market’s expectation of how much capital a bank should carry.  Hence, it is important that 
our result be also valid under market-based capital adequacy norms.  So, we develop two 
methods to estimate the market’s expectation of how much capital a bank needs.  Our first 
market-determined capital adequacy measure is the Peer Portfolio or the PP approach.  We 
construct, for each issuing commercial bank or BHC in our sample, a portfolio of non-issuing 
peers. A non-issuing peer for an issuing commercial bank (or BHC) is a commercial bank 
(BHC) that did not increase its capital through stock issue, private placement or rights 
offerings in the issue year or in the following two years (including banks that do not have 
traded equity as they may have traded debt and still be subject to market pressures).  The 
average total capital ratio of the peer portfolio is the basis on which the market-determined 
capital adequacy norm is estimated for each issuing commercial bank or BHC in our sample.  
We construct the peer portfolio for each issuer in our sample by comparing the issuing 
banking institution with the non-issuing ones on the basis of three variables: Asset, Loan-to-
Asset and Age.  Asset is the total assets of a commercial bank or BHC at the end of the 
calendar year immediately preceding the issue announcement, Loan-to-Asset is the ratio of 
loan assets to total assets as at the end of the calendar year immediately prior to the issue 
announcement, and Age is the age (in years) of the bank, as computed from the date of 
incorporation to the date of the issue announcement.  Asset and Loan-to-Asset are proxies that 
capture the risk of the institution.  Small banking institutions are less diversified and often 
lack access to capital markets; so, the non-issuing peer must be as large as the seasoned 
equity issuer.  Loan-to-Asset represents the share of the risky assets in the balance sheet. 
Considering a group of peers close in Age to the issuing institution takes into account the 
age-appropriateness of the level of capitalization.  Older banking firms are more efficient 
than younger ones, and are less likely to fail. (DeYoung and Hasan, 1998; DeYoung, Hasan, 
and Hunter, 2000).  
To create the peer portfolio, we first choose 125 non-issuing commercial banks (50 non-
issuing BHCs because BHC sample is smaller) that are closest in Asset size to each issuing 




From this matched sample, we pick 50 commercial banks (25 BHCs) that are closest in Loan-
to-Asset.  Finally, from this matched sample (matched to each issuing commercial bank or 
BHC in terms of asset size and loan to asset ratio), we pick the 5 that are closest in Age.  We 
compute the average total capital ratio of these 5 non-issuing banks (BHCs).  However, this 
average is only an estimate of the market requirement.  The market may not necessarily view 
a banking institution that had a few basis points below the peer portfolio average as 
undercapitalized.  So, we use one standard deviation of the average total capital ratio of the 
peer portfolio as the permissible error margin.  The PP requirement is, thus, the peer 
portfolio average total capital ratio minus one standard deviation. 
Our second market-determined capital adequacy measure builds on the notion that all 
the institutions in the peer portfolio satisfy the market requirement, as suggested by the lack 
of stock issues, private placements or rights offerings in the issue year or the following two 
years.  In this case, equaling the total capital ratio of the institution with the lowest total 
capital ratio may be enough to satisfy the market requirement.  Thus, the lowest total capital 
ratio from among the peer portfolio firms becomes the basis for our second market based 
capital requirement measure.  We call this the Peer Minimum (PM) approach.  If the market-
determined total capital ratio requirement, computed using either of the above two methods, 
is below the regulatory requirement, the regulatory requirement becomes binding.  So, the 
maximum of the regulatory requirement and the PP requirement is our PP capital adequacy 
norm, and the maximum of the regulatory requirement and the PM requirement is our PM 
capital adequacy norm.  
Panel C of Table 6 shows that the average announcement period abnormal market 
returns for both VL and IVL issues are significantly negative when the VL-IVL segregation is 
done based on the PM and PP market norms, and there is no difference between them.  
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the investors do not perceive Voluntary and 
Involuntary bank seasoned equity issues to be different at the time of their announcement.  
 
4.2 Is the Negative Announcement period reaction for IVL issuers a sure sign of opportunism? 
A negative market reaction to the announcement of an undercapitalized bank’s SEO, is 
not proof that the root cause of the reaction is perceived market-timing.  In this section, we 
search for signs of market-timing and analyze another plausible reason for the negative 
reaction. 
Announcing an issue immediately after a stock price run-up implies market-timing (see 
Cornett and Tehranian (1994) and Cornett, Mehran, and Tehranian (1998)).  If the negative 




the reaction can be interpreted as a response to perceived opportunism.  Yet, this may not be 
the sole determinant of the market reaction.  The Merton (1974) model implies that a fresh 
influx of equity capital into distressed banks entails a wealth transfer from the shareholders 
to the debt-holders, or alternatively, to the i n s u r e r s  o f  b a n k  d e b t .   W e  t e s t  b o t h  t h e s e  
hypotheses next. 
 
4.2.1 Opportunism in Involuntary Issues 
  We segregate our IVL issues into those that experienced a positive stock price run-up in 
the 60 days before the announcement date, and those that did not.  There are 43 IVL issuers 
that experienced a positive stock price run-up in the pre-announcement date.  Panel A of 
Table 7 shows that the announcement period market reaction for these issues is significantly 
negative, and insignificantly different from zero for the other 20 IVL issuers that did not 
experience a positive stock price run-up just before issue announcement.  Thus, the IVL 
issues that were announced immediately following a stock price run-up are perhaps 
opportunistic, like the VL issues, and like the VL issues, experience a significantly negative 
announcement period return of a magnitude similar to that for the VL issues. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
4.2.2 The Merton Model Implication 
According to the Merton (1974) model, the value of risky debt can be viewed as equal to 
the value of risk-free debt less the value of the put option given to shareholders, which 
allows them to abandon the assets to bondholders if the firm value drops below the value of 
the debt --- i.e., the strike price.  An equity influx lowers the strike price of the put option.  
The value of the put option declines with a decrease in the strike price.  Therefore, the value 
of the risky debt goes up as it becomes safer.  Because the asset values are not affected by the 
financing decisions, the increase in the value of debt comes at the expense of the equity 
holders.   In other words, the equity issue is a wealth transfer from shareholders to 
bondholders.  Well-capitalized banks do not suffer from the same problem because their 
debt may already be considered safe and the additional safety of the equity issue has 
marginal effect on the value of debt. 
To gauge the impact of the wealth-transfer effect, we test the following regression 
specification: 




MARAD(i,j) = α1 IVL + α2 VL + γ1 ln(Dtf) × IVL + γ2 ln(Dtf) × VL + γ3 ln(Dtf)× MARAD(-60,-4) × IVL  
+γ4 ln(Dtf)× MARAD(-60,-4) × VL + γ5 MARAD(-60,-4) × IVL+ γ6 MARAD(-60,-4) × VL 
+β ’IVL X × IVL+β ’VL X × VL + ζit,                           ( 3 )            
             
where, as before, Dtf, is the distance to failure measure, and X is a vector of control variables 
that comprises lnAsset, lnIssue, CMR, Nasdaq, AssetGr-1, PreBasel, and FDICIA.  
The implication of the wealth-transfer effect is that the most-distressed banks will be the 
most negatively affected from the SEO announcement.  If the stock price has been declining 
before the announcement (negative MARAD(-60,-4)) and the distance to failure is short 
(small Dtf), the announcement reaction must be the most negative.  Expressed in terms of the 
sign of the regression coefficients, we expect γ5 to be positive, and γ3 to be negative. 
As expected, Panel B of Table 7 shows that the interaction term ln(Dtf) × MARAD(-60,-4) 
has a significantly negative coefficient and MARAD(-60,-4)  has a significantly positive 
coefficient.  This confirms the Merton model prediction: when an undercapitalized, 
distressed bank announces a stock issue, the equity holders stand to lose the most.  Hence 
the stock price reacts significantly negatively upon such announcements. 
Thus, both managerial opportunism and the reduction in the risk of a distressed bank are 
reasons for the announcement period return being significantly negative, on average, for the 
Involuntary issuers.  But which one dominates?  If the wealth-transfer (Merton model) effect 
is dominant, then we would expect to see the opportunistic voluntary issuers to perform 
more poorly than the involuntary issuers in the long-run, as evidenced in Cornett, Mehran 
and Tehranian (1998).  If the market-timing is the dominant factor, we would expect to see 
both types of issuers to perform equally badly. 
In the next section, we analyze the long-run performance measures to find the dominant 
factor. 
 
5. Post-Issue long-run performance 
We examine 3 different measures of long-run performance: the risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns, the average return on assets, and the average net charge-offs level. Our measure of 
post-issue long-run risk-adjusted returns is FFAR, a calendar-time four-factor-adjusted 
return (Carhart, 1997) at the end of 36 months after the issue month for banks that have 36 
months of continuous returns data available on CRSP.  The four factors are the three Fama 
French factors and the Carhart momentum factor.  From investors’ point of view, recent 
work by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995 and 1996) indicates that a factor model of risk-
adjustments may better explain the cross section of stock returns.  Their three factors are RM, 




investment portfolio formed by subtracting the return on a small firm portfolio from the 
return on a big firm portfolio, and HML, the return on a zero investment portfolio calculated 
as the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a portfolio of 
low book-to-market stocks.  Carhart (1997) shows that the four-factor model that includes the 
momentum factor, UMD, results in risk-adjusted abnormal returns that have somewhat 
better properties.9  The four-factor time-series regression model is 
 
rit = αi + bi × RMt + si × SMBt + hi × HMLt + ui × UMDt + ζit,                         (4) 
 
where rit is the excess return (over the risk free rate) on stock or portfolio i over period t, and 
ζ is an error term. The coefficients b,  s,  h, and u are time-invariant risk-loadings.  The 
regression intercept α is FFAR. As Gompers and Lerner (2003) emphasize, it has an 
interpretation analogous to that of Jensen’s alpha in a CAPM framework.  Our second 
measure of long-run performance is the Return on Assets, computed as Net Income divided 
by Total Assets, averaged over the 3 years after the offer annually, ROA.  Our third measure 
of long-run performance is the Net-Charge-offs levels, averaged over the 3 years after the 
offer annually, NCO.  All figures needed to compute ROA and NCO are taken from the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s Reports and Income and Condition (call 
reports) for commercial banks and Y-9 statements for BHCs.  Panel A of Table 8 shows the 
mean and median numbers for the VL and IVL issues for both the full sample and the pre-
Basel I periods. 
 
Table 8 here 
 
Panel A shows that across all 3 measures of long-run performance of the firm, and for 
both time periods examined, the VL issuers seem to perform worse than the IVL issuers post-
issue, but not significantly so.  The net-charge-off numbers are significantly different between 
these 2 samples of SEOs but only in the 1983-1989 period (NCO is higher for the Voluntary 
issuers).  This is consistent with our finding that voluntary and involuntary issuers can be 
equally opportunistic.10 
                                                 
9 We obtain the necessary factor returns from Ken French’s web site at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
10 This finding weakly confirms the findings of Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1998) who find a significant 
difference in the post-issue performance in the 1983-1989 period using long-run BHAR and matched-adjusted 




Next, we examine the delistings from CRSP within 5 years post issue.  We distinguish 
between Positive Delistings, where the bank’s market-adjusted stock return is positive in the 
60-day window prior to the delisting and Negative Delistings, where the return is negative. 
Denoting the individual response levels by d ∈{-1, 0, +1} where “-1” indicates a negative 
delisting event, “+1” a positive event and surviving banks are denoted by “0”, we fit a 
cumulative complementary log-log (cloglog) model defined as, 
() Χ β α ′ + = ≤ k k d g Pr(  
where  () ) 1 log( log ) ( p p g − − = ,  k e q u a l s  + 1  o r  0 ,  a n d  X comprises lnAsset, lnIssue, CMR, 
Nasdaq, AssetGr-1,  RealEstate,  εD,  εISS, Branches, Previss, ROA0, NCO0, Age, Capratio, VL, 
PreBasel,  and FDICIA.  Branches is the natural log of a bank’s number of branches.  The 
number of branches may determine how attractive the bank is as a takeover target.   
RealEstate is the share of real estate loans in a bank’s total assets.  It captures the effect of the 
real-estate debacle in the late 1980s on the takeover probability of a bank.  Age is the natural 
log of a bank’s age plus one.  Younger banks tend to disappear faster.  Previss is a dummy 
that equals one if the bank has multiple SEOs within a 5-year time frame and zero otherwise.  
ROA0 and NCO0 are the return-on-assets and net charge-offs as a percentage of assets 
at the time of issue. 
Cloglog is the appropriate link function when the modeled event is a rare occurrence and 
observations are not evenly distributed across response levels.
11  The first column of Panel B 
of Table 8 presents the results, which shows that an equal slope assumption is rejected. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to analyze positive and negative outcomes separately. 
We estimate a Split Population Survival Model (SPSM) (Schmidt and Witte, 1989) to 
allow for a non-zero survival probability.  In other words, we define the log-likelihood 
contribution for bank i as 
( ) () it i t i it i i S c c d S h c d L ) 1 ( ln ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ln ln 1 − + − + − = −  (5) 
where d is the delisting indicator (=1 if delisting observed, 0 otherwise), c is the survival 





ij it h S
1
) 1 ( , hit is the 
discrete time hazard, which has the cloglog form,  () () i it x t h β′ + − − = ) log( exp exp 1 , where 
log(t) represents duration dependence in the hazard common to each issuer.  The first term 
                                                 
11 We find that the Cloglog function provides a better fit to our data than either logit or probit link functions 




in (5) is the contribution to the likelihood by the delisted banks.  It represents (1-c) *(hit : 
probability of the delisting in the given quarter) *(Si t-1 : probability of survival to end of 
previous time quarter).  The second term in (5) represents the probability of survival, c, plus 
the probability that the issuer will delist in the future but the delisting is not observed in the 
observation period. 
The last four columns of Panel B present the results for positive and negative delistings.  
The first result reported is the standard cumulative complementary log-log model, which 
assumes that the survival probability (no delisting), c, is zero.  While this assumption cannot 
be rejected among the negative outcomes, it is strongly rejected among the positive 
outcomes.  In other words, we cannot reject the null that all banks will eventually face a 
negative delisting.  The null that all banks will face a positive delisting is rejected at 1% 
confidence level; the probability of eluding the positive outcome is 81 percent.  We find that 
the  VL dummy reduces the probability of a positive delisting event and increases the 
probability of a negative event.  This result is consistent with the conjecture that voluntary 
issues are made by opportunistic managers and that these issuers are more likely to get 
delisted after a negative stock price run down within 5 years after the issue.  Thus, we find 
marginal support for the Cornett, Mehran, and Tehranian results. 
Our analysis of long-run performance suggests that, with the exception of the delisting 
analysis, the long-run performance is statistically the same for both types of offers.   
Therefore, of the two forces that generate the negative announcement period return, Merton-
model vs. market-timing effects, market timing seems to be the dominant force. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Cornett and Tehranian (1994) segregate bank seasoned equity offers (SEOs) into 
Voluntary and Involuntary offers.  They contend that Involuntary issues are made by banks 
under duress from bank examiners because they are not adequately capitalized. 
Accordingly, the "window of opportunity" or issue timing discretion may be limited for such 
offers.  On the other hand, Voluntary issues are made by already well-capitalized banks and 
are more likely to be made by opportunistic managers when their stock is overvalued.  
In this comprehensive study of bank SEOs, we find that the market does not appear to 
perceive the Voluntary and Involuntary issuers to be different.  Both the Involuntary issuers 
and the Voluntary issuers experience similar significant negative price reaction upon 
announcement.  We cannot support Cornett and Tehranian’s results for the overall sample 
period as well as for the sub-period that corresponds to the Cornett and Tehranian study 




both Voluntary and Involuntary issuers: both types of issuers seem to be timing their 
seasoned equity issues. 
We find no significant difference in the amount of offer price discount between the two 
types of offers.  However, we find that the price effect of the unexpected offer price discount 
is significantly negative for Voluntary issues, and insignificant for Involuntary issues.  We 
conjecture that the Involuntary issuers issue stock because they need the equity capital for 
regulatory reasons.  But they also approach the market at an opportune time given the 
constraint that they need to raise equity capital within a certain time period.  The market 
reaction at the time of announcement appears to correctly price in the extent of market 
timing.  The offer price discount of an involuntary issue is a sign of the investment banker’s 
desire to place the issue of a troubled bank and not necessarily a signal of opportunism. 
Voluntary issuers, on the other hand, face no urgent capital requirement, and have more 
discretion to optimally time their issues. It appears that all information about managerial 
opportunism in Voluntary issues have not been priced in at the time of announcement.   
Some more evidence is gathered by the investment bankers in the period between the 
announcement and issue dates and passed on to investors via the offer price discount.   
Hence, the offer price discount is followed immediately by a significantly negative price 
effect on issue date for these issuers. 
Indeed, in the long-run post-issue, we confirm that the Involuntary issuers perform no 
worse than the Voluntary issuers in terms of the average return on assets, the average net 
charge-offs levels, the 4-factor risk-adjusted abnormal returns.  Voluntary issuers perform 
significantly worse in terms of the probability of delisting after a price run-down and the 
average net charge-offs levels in the 1983-1989 period.  
The conclusion is that the “market for lemons” problem exists, albeit in varying degrees, 
for all equity issuances, and hence the market reaction is also generally negative to all equity 
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Calculations of total capital ratio for Bank Holding Companies 
This table shows year-by-year detailed calculations of total capital ratio for bank holding companies. Total capital ratio is (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/ 
Asset Base. 
Period  Tier 1  Tier 2  Asset Base  Remarks 
Pre-1990  Common stock (CS)  Limited-life preferred stock (LLPS)  Total assets 
(ECM+ECN+PDI+PPS) in Tier 1< 0.333 
Tier 1 
  Perpetual preferred stock (PPS) (restricted) 
Subordinated notes and debentures and unsecured 
long-term debt (SND + LTD)  ALL  (ECM+ECN+PDI) in Tier 1< 0.2 Tier 1 
  Surplus (SU)  MCI + PDI + PPS+ ECM not allowed in Tier 1  Deduct Allocated transfer risk reserves (TRR)  ECM in Tier 1< 0.1 Tier 1 
  Undivided profits (UP)      Tier 2< 0.5 Tier 1 
  Contingency and other capital reserves (CR)       
  Equity commitment notes (ECM) (restricted)       
  Equity contract notes (ECN) (restricted)       
 
Allowance for loan and lease losses (exclusive 
of allocated transfer risk reserves) (ALL)      
  Minority Interest (MI)       
  Perpetual debt instruments (PDI) (restricted)       
  Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECM       
  Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECN       
              
1990-1991  CS  NPPS + CPPS not allowed in Tier 1  Risk-weighted assets (exclusive of IUBS and RHCI)
(NPPS+CPPS) in Tier 1<0.33 
(CS+SU+UP+CR+MI) 
  Noncumulative PPS (NPPS) (restricted)  ALL (restricted)  Deduct ALL in excess of allowed amount in Tier 2  ALL in Tier 2< 0.015 Risk-weighted assets 
  Cumulative PPS (CPPS) (restricted) 
Maturity-weighted Intermediate-term preferred stock 
(ITPS) (restricted)  Deduct Goodwill  (SND+ITPS)< 0.5 Tier 1 - Goodwill 
  SU  Maturity-weighted Long-term preferred stock (LTPS)  Deduct TRR  LTD< 0.5 Tier 1 - Goodwill 
  UP Maturity-weighted  SND  (restricted)    Tier 2< Tier 1 - Goodwill 
  CR Maturity-weighted  LTD  (restricted)   
Deduct Reciprocal holdings of capital 
instruments (RHCI) of banking 
organizations from Total Capital BUT not 
from components 
  MI PDI   
If Tier 2 excl. IUBS<0.5 IUBS Deduct excess 
IUBS from Tier 1 
  Deduct Goodwill  ECM   
If a bank is engaging in high-risk activities, 
all intangible assets rather than goodwill 
are deducted from Tier 1 
 
Deduct 0.5 Investments in unconsolidated 




Table A.1 contd. 
 
1990-1991 
contd    Hybrid capital instruments (HCI)     
    Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECM     
    Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECN     
   Deduct  0.5  IUBS     
              
1992  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991 EXCEPT 
        ALL in Tier 2< 0.0125 Risk-weighted assets 
              
1993-1994  Same as 1992 EXCEPT  Same as 1992 EXCEPT  Same as 1992  Same as 1992 EXCEPT 
 
Non-cumulative PPS (NPPS) (now 
unrestricted)  CPPS not allowed in Tier 1   
CPPS in Tier 1<0.33 
(CS+SU+UP+CR+MI+NPPS) 
              
1995-1998  Same as 1993-1995 EXCEPT  Same as 1993-1995 EXCEPT  Same as 1993-1995 EXCEPT  Same as 1993-1995 EXCEPT 
 
Deduct All intangible assets EXCEPT Mortgage 
servicing rights (MSR) (restricted) and 
Purchased credit card relationships (PCCR) 
(restricted)  Include MSR + PCCR excluded from Tier 1 
Deduct All intangible assets EXCEPT MSR and 
PCCR  (SND+ITPS)< 0.5 Tier 1 - Other intangibles 
  Deduct Deferred tax assets (DTA) (see remark)   Deduct Deferred tax assets (DTA) (see remark)  LTD< 0.5 Tier 1 - Other intangibles 
        Tier 2< Tier 1 - Other intangibles 
        (MSR + PCCR) in Tier 1< 0.5 Tier 1 
        PCCR in Tier 1< 0.25 Tier 1 
      
DTA to be realized in the next 12 months 
can be included in Tier 1 upto 10 percent of 
Tier 1 
              
Post-1998    SAME AS 1996-1998 EXCEPT    SAME AS 1996-1998 EXCEPT 
   
Include Unrealized holding gains on equity securities 
(UGE) (restricted)   
Upto 45 percent of UGE may be included 
in Tier 2 





Calculations of total capital ratio for Banks 
 
This table shows year-by-year detailed calculations of total capital ratio for banks. Total capital ratio is (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/ Asset Base. 
 
Period  Tier 1  Tier 2  Asset Base  Remarks 
Pre-1990  Common stock (CS)  Limited-life preferred stock (LLPS)  Average total assets  ECN in Tier 1$<$0.1667 Tier 1 
  Perpetual preferred stock (PPS)  Subordinated notes and debentures (SND) 
Allowance for loan and lease losses 
(exclusive of allocated transfer risk reserves) LLPS and SND in Tier 2$<$ 0.5 Tier 1 
  Surplus (SU)  Equity commitment notes (ECM)  Deduct Goodwill   
  Undivided profits (UP)  Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECM     
  Contingency and other capital reserves (CR)       
  Equity contract notes (ECN)       
 
Allowance for loan and lease losses (exclusive 
of allocated transfer risk reserves) (ALL)      
  Minority Interest (MI)       
 Deduct  Goodwill       
  Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECN       
        
1990-1991  CS ALL  (restricted) 
Risk-weighted assets (exclusive of ICS and 
RHCI)  NPPS<0.25 Tier 1 
  Noncumulative PPS (NPPS)  All other PPS 
Deduct ALL in excess of allowed amount in 
Tier 2  ALL <0.0125 Risk-weighted Assets 
 SU 
Long-term preferred stock (LTPS)  (original maturity 
>20 years) 
Deduct Allocated transfer risk reserves 
(TRR)  (SND+ITPS) < 0.5 Tier 1 net of goodwill 
 UP  ECN  Deduct  Goodwill 
Deduct Investments in certain subsidiaries (ICS) 
from total capital but not from components 
 CR  SND  (restricted)   
Deduct Reciprocal holdings of capital instruments 
(RHCI) of banking organizations from Total 
Capital BUT not from components 
 MI 
Maturity-weighted Intermediate-term preferred stock 
(ITPS) (restricted)    Tier 2 < Tier 1 net of goodwill 
  Deduct Goodwill  Hybrid capital instruments (HCI)     




Table A.2 contd. 
 
1992-1994  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991 EXCEPT 
      
ALL in Tier 2< 0.0125 Risk-weighted 
assets 
              
1995-1998  Same as 1992-1994 EXCEPT  Same as 1992-1994  Same as 1992-1994 EXCEPT  Same as 1992-1994 EXCEPT 
 
Deduct all intangible assets EXCEPT purchased 
mortgage servicing rights (MSR) and 
purchased credit card relationships (PCCR) 
(restricted)    Deduct All intangible assets EXCEPT MSR and PCCR  MSR + PCCR < 0.5 Tier 1 
  Deduct Deferred tax assets (DTA) (see remark)   Deduct Deferred tax assets (DTA) (see remark)  PCCR < 0.25 Tier 1 
      
DTA to be realized in the next 12 
months can be included in Tier 1 upto 
10 percent of Tier 1 
              
Post-1998  Same as 1995-1998  SAME AS 1995-1998 EXCEPT  Same as 1995-1998  Same as 1995-1998 EXCEPT 
   
Include Unrealized holding gains on equity securities 
(UGE) (restricted)   
Upto 45 percent of UGE may be 
included in Tier 2 
        (MSR + PCCR) in Total Capital<Tier 1 




Voluntary and Involuntary Seasoned Equity Offerings  
 
This table shows the year-by-year distribution of Voluntary (VL) and Involuntary (IVL) bank SEOs, of our sample 











1983 6  2  1992  2  32 
1984 10  5  1993  0  12 
1985 19  9  1994  0  0 
1986 21  23  1995  0  6 
1987 0  10  1996  0  4 
1988 1  5  1997  1  5 
1989 1  9  1998  1  8 
1990 1  5  1999  0  3 




Descriptive Statistics of Bank SEOs Segregated into Voluntary and Involuntary Issuers 
 
This Panel shows the average, the median, the minimum and the maximum values of several issue- and issuer-related variables for our sample of 227 commercial bank and 
bank holding company (together referred to as banks) SEOs, segregated into Voluntary (VL) and Involuntary (IVL) issues. Total Capital Ratio is the ratio of Tier1+Tier2 
capital over assets as defined in the Appendix., Assets of the issuing bank at the end of the quarter immediately preceding issue announcement, Issue Size is the gross issue 
proceeds from the offering exclusive of overallotment options, CMR is the Carter-Manaster investment banker reputation score, as modified by Ritter and made available 
on his web site: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.xls, PreBasel is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the issue occurred before the Basel I capital adequacy regulatory norm was 
announced in 1988, and FDICIA is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the issue occurred after Basel I went into effect but before FDICIA was enacted in 1991. Branches is 
the number of bank branches the bank/BHC has.  Age is the bank’s age.  Previss is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer had a previous SEO in the last five years before the 
current issue.  RealEstate is the share of real estate loans in the bank’s total assets.  ROA0 is the ROA before the issue. NCO0 is the net charge offs-to-assets before the issue.  
AssetGr-1 is the growth rate of assets in the year before issue announcement.  Dtf is distance-to-failure defined as the market value of equity divided by the standard 
deviation of the market value of equity.  The degree of undercapitalization, UnderCap, is the dollar amount of equity capital needed, as a fraction of total assets, to meet the 
capital requirements as of the end of the quarter before the issue announcement. The degree of overcapitalization, OverCap, is the dollar amount by which the equity capital 
exceeds the capital requirements as a fraction of total assets, at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement. “N/A” denotes “Not Applicable”.  All numbers are 
percentages where applicable. 
 
 
(Table on next page) 







  Involuntary Sample n = 63    Voluntary Sample n = 164 
  Mean Median  Minimum    Maximum    Mean Median  Minimum    Maximum 
Total Capital Ratio  6.29 6.29 4.05 9.88    13.10  12.65 7.02  26.55 
Assets ($ mn)  8,212 1,723  40 173,597    14,555  3,050  61  194,415 
Assets
IssueSize
  1.61  0.99  0.06  11.13    1.69  0.94 0.07 31.08 
CMR  7.79 8.33 1.10 9.10    7.99 8.83  1.10  9.10 
PreBasel  0.90 0  0  1    0.33 0  0  1 
FDICIA  0.03 0  0  1    0.24 0  0  1 
Branches  85 39  1 664    153 43  1  1860 
Age  14 14  1 102    17  15 1 105 
Previss  0.11 0  0  1    0.21 0  0  1 
RealEstate  21.29 19.76  0.58  56.50    29.03 26.85  2.18  67.63 
ROA0  0.85 0.83 0.96 1.78    0.82 0.88 -1.55  3.32 
MARAD(-60, -4)  4.57 5.39  -24.75  36.36    6.09 5.11 -25.58 63.36 
NCO 0  0.43 0.28 -0.08 2.20    0.69 0.43  0.01  0.43 
AssetGr-1  22.92 17.49 -4.95 81.20    27.15 19.71 -13.03 159.71 
Dtf †  8.60  7.97  3.53  16.54    9.25  8.40 3.33 33.35 
UnderCap  0.91 0.79 0.03 2.95    N/A  N/A  N/A N/A 
OverCap  N/A N/A N/A N/A    3.54  2.80  0.02  14.37 
† There are 45 observations in IVL and 131 observations in VL 





This table shows the offer date Discount, the difference between previous day closing price and offer price, 
divided by previous day closing price, and the discount surprise, the residual, εD, of the following regression 
specification: 
 
Discount = β1IVL + β2VL + β3 lnIssue x IVL+ β4 lnIssue x VL + β5 lnMVE x IVL+ β6 lnMVE x VL + β7 CMR x IVL 








 x VL 
+ β13 Stdev x IVL + β14 Stdev x VL + εD, 
 
run separately for the VL and IVL issues, where P-5 is the closing price 5 days before the Issue date, stdev(-121,-22) 
is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted return in the 100 day period from 121 days before the issue date 
through 22 days before the issue date. The relative size of the offer is captured by the two variables: lnIssue, the 
natural log of the gross issue proceeds from the offering exclusive of overallotment options, and lnMVE, the 
natural log of the market value of equity as computed 7 days before the offer date. Nasdaq is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the stock trades on Nasdaq, and 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the mean Discount for VL 
and IVL issues, while Panel B shows the regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics in parenthesis of the 




  IVL VL 
Difference of Means 
(p-values) 
N 63  164   DISCOUNT 
(percent)  MEAN  1.52 1.90  0.53 
 
Panel B 
  DISCOUNT 
  IVL VL 
Intercept  0.122 0.082 
  (2.03) (2.73) 
lnIssue  0.006 0.005 
 (0.60)  (1.25) 
CMR   -0.003 -0.002 
  (-0.30) (-0.20) 
Nasdaq  0.004 0.005 
 (0.00)  (0.50) 
1/P-5  -0.184 0.025 
 (-1.23)  (0.19) 
lnMVE  -0.009  -0.006 
 (-0.90)  (2.40) 
Stdev(-121,-22)  24.108  6.573 
  (2.21)  (1.71) 
Adjusted R2 (%)  31.01 
Tests: (p-values)     




Issue Date Returns 
 
Panel A shows the mean and median of the issue day returns, MARISS, for all banks, for banks that have greater 
than $1 billion in total assets at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement (“big” issuers), and for 
“big” issues: issue sizes that are greater than 1% of the total assets of a bank. Bold-italic numbers denote 
significantly different from zero at the 5%, significance level. 
Panel B shows the regression coefficient estimates (t-statistics in parentheses) when the issue date returns are 
regressed on several issue-specific variables using the following regression specifications:   
   
MARISS = β1 IVL +β2 VL +β3 UnderCap +β4 OverCap +β5 εD x IVL +β6 εD x VL+β ’IVL X x IVL+β ’VL X x VL + εISS 
 
run separately for the VL and IVL issues, where X is a vector of CMR, lnAsset, lnIssue, PreBasel, FDICIA, Previss, 
Nasdaq, AssetGr-1, where lnAsset is the natural log of the total assets of the issuing bank at the end of the quarter 
immediately preceding issue announcement, Previss is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer had a previous SEO in 
the last five years before the current issue and AssetGr-1 is the growth rate of assets in the year preceding the 
issue, and εD is the Discount surprise. Bold-italic numbers denote significantly different from zero at the 5% 
significance level.   
 
All SEOs 
  IVL VL 
Difference of 
Means (p-values) 
N 63  164  
MEAN  0.09 -0.24  0.41 
MARISS  
(percent) 
Median -0.01  -0.17   
        
 
Big Issuers 
  IVL VL 
Difference of 
Means (p-values) 
N 39  112  
MEAN  -0.02 -0.31  0.43 
MARISS  
(percent) 
Median 0.02  -0.31   
        
 
Big Issues 
  IVL VL 
Difference of 
Means (p-values) 
N 30  77   
MEAN  0.15 -0.23  0.59 
MARISS  
(percent) 
Median 0.09  -0.29   








          Panel B 
  MARISS 
  IVL VL 
Intercept  0.002 0.004 
  (0.00) (0.20) 
UnderCap for IVL  (Overcap for VL)  -0.54 0.017 
  (-1.10) (0.21) 
εD  -0.134  -0.293 
 (-1.91)  (-5.86) 
lnIssue  0.002 -0.003 
 (0.20)  (-0.30) 
CMR  0.006  0.002 
  (3.00)  (1.00) 
Nasdaq  -0.005  -0.009 
  (-0.50)  (-2.57) 
LnAsset  -0.001 -0.004 
  (-0.33) (-1.33) 
PreBasel  -0.008 0.002 
  (-0.80) (0.20) 
FDICIA  -0.051  -0.002 
  (-2.55)  (-0.20) 
AssetGr-1  -0.033 -0.007 
 (-1.65)  (-0.70) 
Adjusted R2 (%)  14.52 
Tests: (p-values)     
i) β1= β2  0.90 
ii)  β5 = β6  0.07 




Announcement Period Returns 
 






t v t r )] ( ) ( [ , where r(t) is the stock return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
value-weighted market returns. For example, MARAD(-1, 0) is  the market-adjusted announcement period 
returns from the day before the announcement date to the announcement date, and MARAD(-60,-4) is the pre-
announcement period abnormal returns from 60 days before issue announcement through 4 days before 
announcement date. The descriptive statistics are shown for Voluntary (VL) and Involuntary (IVL) issues made 
in all years 1983-1999, as well as for those made in the Cornett and Tehranian (CT) (1994) sample period: 1983-
1989. Bold-italic numbers denote significantly different from zero at the 5%, significance level. 
 
Panel A 









N 63  164   58  63   
MEAN  -1.01 -0.88  0.78  -1.01 -1.12 0.83  MARAD(-1,0) 
Median -0.98  -0.84    -0.95  -0.97   
N 63  164   58  63   
MEAN  -1.26 -1.16  0.86  -1.23 -1.77 0.38  MARAD (-1,+1)  
Median -1.24  -1.27    -1.24  -1.92   
N 63  164   58  63   
MEAN  -1.51  -0.74 0.30  -1.36 -1.83 0.56  MARAD (-3,+3)  
Median -1.62  -0.76    -1.56  -1.32   
N 63  164   58  63   
MEAN  4.57 6.09  0.44  4.44 3.90  0.80  MARAD (-60,-4)  
Median 5.39  5.11    5.47  3.62   




Robustness Checks of Announcement Period Returns 
This Table shows the mean average announcement period abnormal returns for VL and IVL issues. The 





t v t r )] ( ) ( [ , where r(t) is the stock 
return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market returns. In Panel A, 
VL-IVL segregation is based on regulatory norms + 1% cushion. In Panel B, VL-IVL segregation is based on the 
distance to failure measure, computed as the market value of equity divided by the standard deviation of equity. 
In Panel C, the VL-IVL segregation is based on market-determined Peer minimum or Peer Average, PM and PP, 
norms. Bold-italic numbers denote significantly different from zero at the 5%, significance level. 
 
 
Panel A : 1% Equity Cushion Norm 









N  104 123    90  31   
MARAD (-1,0)  -0.565 -1.207  0.127  -0.788 -1.884  0.063 
MARAD (-1,+1)  -1.048 -1.309  0.595  -1.219 -2.369  0.104 
MARAD (-3,+3)  -1.018  -0.905  0.865  -1.273 -2.573  0.162 
  
Panel B : Distance to failure Norm 









N  88 88    45  46   
MARAD (-1,0)  -0.802 -1.110  0.532  -1.282 -1.173  0.866 
MARAD (-1,+1)  -1.033 -1.350  0.592  -1.569 -1.596  0.972 
MARAD (-3,+3)  -0.354  -1.038  0.370 -1.464   -1.361  0.917 
 
Panel C: Market-determined Capital Adequacy Norm 









N  75 152    92  135   
MARAD (-1,0)  -1.04 -0.85  0.66  -0.65 -1.09  0.30 
MARAD (-1,+1)  -1.36 -1.11  0.63  -1.07 -1.27  0.69 
MARAD (-3,+3)  -1.51  -0.68 0.24  -1.09  -0.87 0.74 





Explanations for the Negative Announcement Period Returns for IVL Issues 
 
Panel A shows the average announcement period abnormal returns, MARAD(-1,0), MARAD(-1,+1), and 
MARAD(-3,+3), for IVL issues segregated by those that had a positive price run-up in the pre-announcement 
period, and those that did not. Panel B shows the regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics when the 
announcement period abnormal returns are regressed on the distance to failure (Dtf), the pre-announcement 
period return, MARAD(-60,-4), their interaction term and X, a vector of control variables that comprises lnAsset, 
lnIssue, CMR, Nasdaq, AssetGr-1, PreBasel, and FDICIA. 
 
MARAD(i,j) = α1 IVL + α2 VL + γ1 ln(Dtf) × IVL + γ2 ln(Dtf) × VL + γ3 ln(Dtf)× MARAD(-60,-4) × IVL 
+ γ4 ln(Dtf)× MARAD(-60,-4) × VL + γ5 MARAD(-60,-4) × IVL+ γ6 MARAD(-60,-4) × VL 
+ β ’IVL X × IVL+β ’VL X × VL + ζit, 
 
Bold-italic numbers denote significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.   
 
Panel A : Test of Managerial Opportunism: The Run-up 









N 20  43   
MARAD(-1,0) 
MEAN  -0.101  -1.40  0.05 
N 20  43   
MARAD (-1,+1)  
MEAN  -0.300  -1.70  0.11 
N 20  43   
MARAD (-3,+3)  
MEAN  -0.700  -1.90  0.32 
 
Panel B: Test of the Merton Model 
  MARAD (-1,0)    MARAD (-1,+1) 
  IVL VL    IVL  VL 
Intercept   -0.071 -0.011    -0.103  -0.022 
 (-1.01)  (-0.37)    (-1.29)  (-0.55) 
Ln(Dtf)  0.035 -0.002    0.053  -0.001 
 (1.75)  (-0.20)    (1.77)  (-0.10) 
Ln(Dtf) x MARAD(-60, -4)  -0.509  -0.04   -0.714  -0.028 
  (-2.04)  (-0.80)  (-2.46)  (-0.47) 
MARAD(-60, -4)  0.89 0.093    1.285  0.100 
 (-1.78)  (0.85)    (2.18)  (0.77) 
Adjusted R2 (%)  6.65    9.52 
Tests: (p-values)       
 i) α1 = α2 0.90    0.90 





Post-issue Long-run Performance 
  
Panel A shows the mean and median value of the 3-year post issue FFAR (the 4-factor risk-adjusted long-run 
calendar time abnormal returns), ROA (the return on assets in the 3 years after the issue), and NCO (the net- 
charge-offs in the 3 years after the issue), for the VL and IVL issues. Panel B shows the probability of outcomes 
within 5 years after the issue, modeled using a cumulative complementary log-log model (-1 denotes negative 
delisting, 0 denotes not delisted, and +1 positive delisting), where positive delisting is the term used for banks 
that get delisted from CRSP within 5 years after the issue after a stock price run up, and negative delisting is the 
term used for banks that get delisted from CRSP within 5 years after the issue after a stock price run down.  Bold-
italic numbers denote significantly different from zero at the 5%, significance level. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Panel A 









N 59  140   55  55   
MEAN  0.11 -0.01  0.52  0.11  -0.15  0.31 
FFAR 
(percent) 
Median 0.21  0.16    0.21  0.13   
N 59  136   54  52   
MEAN  0.73 0.61  0.76  0.70  -0.12 0.19 
ROA 
(percent) 
Median 0.81  0.96    0.81  0.70   
N 59  136   54  52   
MEAN  0.53 0.71  0.19  0.54 1.10  0.01 
NCO 
(percent) 













  Complementary 
Log-Log 
SPSM   Complementary 
Log-Log 
SPSM 
Hazard  Intercept (+1)  -10.5548    -4.1328 -7.3708    -6.6435 
    (40.17)    (-2.26) (-2.18)    (-2.12) 
 Intercept (0)  -6.5019           
   (16.55)           
 Log(t)  2.4337    0.4960  3.1577    1.2333 
   (27.30)    (1.71)  (4.12)    (2.00) 
  εISS  4.4875    7.2871  39.0216   5.1350 
   (0.85)    (1.01)  (2.50)   (0.40) 
 Issue  -0.0719    -0.2325  -2.9315   -0.5626 
   (0.21)    (-0.73)  (-3.65)   (-0.99) 
 CMR  -0.0160    0.0202  0.7724   -0.1646 
   (0.03)    (0.13)  (2.13)   (-0.74) 
 Capratio  0.5544    1.0775 4.8682    -8.2109 
   (0.04)    (0.21) (0.64)    (-0.96) 
  εD  1.4966    -1.0245 -33.1787    5.3083 
   (0.28)    (-0.24) (-1.61)    (0.84) 
 LnAsset  -0.0567    -0.3096  -2.7869    -1.2052 
   (0.18)    (-1.17)  (-3.91)    (-2.23) 
 Branches  0.0001    -0.1025 -0.0256    1.0941 
   (0.02)    (-0.55) (-0.09)    (2.21) 
 RealEstate  1.2695    -3.4875  1.6792  -1.2712 
   (1.62)    (-2.25)  (0.94)  (-0.49) 
 VL  0.1345    0.3286  -2.0412    2.8095 
   (0.22)    (0.64)  (-2.61)    (2.39) 
Pr (Survival) =0, 
reduces to the 
Complementary 
Log-Log model 
Survival  Intercept       1.4411      
         (6.45)      









Log Likelihood   -200.99    -158.99  -147.28    -66.15   
Pr (Survival) =         0.809       
Test: 
Pr (Survival) =0 
  
        
Chi-Sqr.         23.420       
p-value         0.000       






Distribution of MARISS(0,0) for Voluntary and Involuntary issues made in 1983-1999. 
 
This figure shows the frequency histogram plots of the issue date abnormal returns, MARISS(0,0), for Voluntary 































Distribution of MARAD (-1,+1) for Voluntary and Involuntary issues made in the Cornett and Tehranian (1994) sample 
period 1983-1989. 
 
This figure shows the frequency histogram plots of the announcement period abnormal returns, MARAD (-1,+1),  
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